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Severalalgorithmshavebeenproposedto implementintrusiondetectionsystems(IDS)
basedon the ideathatanomaliesin thebehavior of a systemmight beproducedby a set
of actionsof an intruder or by a systemfault. Almost no previous researchhasbeen
conductedin theareaof anomalydetectionfor highperformanceclusters.
Theresearchreportedin thisthesisdemonstratesthattheanalysisof sequencesof func-
tion calls issuedby oneor moreprocessescanbeusedto verify thecorrectexecutionof
parallelprogramswritten in C/C++with theMessagePassingInterface(MPI) in acluster
of Linux workstations.The functionscallswerecollectedvia library interposition.Two
anomalydetectionalgorithmspreviously reportedto be effective methodsfor anomaly
detectionin sequencesof systemcalls, HiddenMarkov Model andsequencematching,
wereimplementedandtested.In general,thesimplersequencematchingalgorithmout-
performedtheHiddenMarkov Model.
As aresultof ourexperiments,MPIguard,thefirst distributed-IDSapproachfor ahigh-
performanceenvironmentwasimplementedanda new datasetfor theanomalydetection
communitywasgenerated.MPIguardis highly portableandcanbeusedasperformance
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basedontheideathatanomaliesin thenormalbehavior of asystemmightbeproducedby
asetof actionsof anintruderor by asystemfault. Dif ferentcomponentsof aninformation
systemcanbemodeledby usingdifferenttypesof data.Network traffic, resourceusage,
operatingsystemcallsandlog eventsareamongthemostimportant.However, we know
of no previouswork in IDS architecturesthatappliesartificial intelligencetechniquesto
the analysisof datacollectedfrom a high performanceenvironmentto detectabnormal
behavior.
Oneof the first algorithmsusedto analyzetracesfrom UNIX processeswas imple-
mentedby Forrestand Longstaf [12]. They also producedand publisheda complete
datasetof processtracesthat is widely usedfor testingsystemcall analysisalgorithms.
Suchalgorithmsgenerallyare usedto analyzethe behavior of standardprogramslike
sendmailor lpr. Thesametechniquemightbeusedto detectanomaliesfrom any program
givenaconsiderablelibrary of sampletraces.
However, “as user-level library functionsreplaceoperatingsystemcalls as the pre-
ferredway for programsto efficiently usesystemservices,therangeof programactivities
1
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observablevia systemcall tracingwill decreasefurther. This will increasethe needto
monitor within applicationsandtheir libraries” [28, p.3]. Othersdatastreamshave also
beenusedby researchersto implementIDSs. ExamplesincludeCORBA methodinvoca-
tions[36] andlanguagelibrary calls[18].
Actual UNIX andLinux systemssupportcollectionof informationin real time from
any process,including parallelprogramsimplementedin C with a MessagePassingIn-
terface(MPI) architecture.With suchtechniquesa tool canbe deployed to restrict the
executionof programsby enforcinga securitypolicy on the network, memoryandfile
accesses.This methodis known assandboxingbecausethetargetprocessis confinedin-
sidea safeenvironment. Anothermethodusedto control theexecutionof a processis a
real-timehost-basedanomalydetector. Sucha techniqueallowsdetectionof deviationsof
thecurrentprocessfrom adatabasethatrepresentsthe”normal” behavior of theprogram.
The databasecanbe describedin term of rules, state-transitionmachines,performance
statistics,etc.
Figure1.1 (taken from Ko, Fink andLevitt [19]) shows thebehavior modelof privi-
legedprograms.As we cansee,thedottedlinescorrespondto security-relevantbehavior
of theprogramthatcanbegatheredwith audit trails,andit is differentfrom theexpected
behavior (a benignprogram)andtheactualbehavior (possiblybadbehavior). Sometech-
niquescontrol the expectedbehavior of a program(e.g. analysisof the sourcecode),
whereasothersonly checkfootprintsof potentiallybadbehavior. As an example,in the
modelproposedby Ko, Fink andLevitt [19], sandboxingcanbe implementedby using
3
audit trials to createa specification-basedmodelof intendedbehavior. The samemodel
canbeappliedto a realtimeanomaly-detector.
Figure1.1Programsbehavior
A clusterof workstationsis aspecialenvironmentof interestbecausegenerallyparallel
programsrunningin suchadistributedenvironmentrepresentlargeandperiodictasks,and
they canbemodeledby usingthesametechniquesusedto createa signatureof a process
in a singlehost.Thus,we presentthedesignof ananomalydetectionmodelfor a cluster




As previously mentioned,we know of no work thathasbeenpublishedthat applies
artificial intelligencetechniquesto theanalysisof datacollectedfromahighspeednetwork
to detectabnormalbehavior. Furthermore,given the amountof dataproducedin such
an environment,many of the algorithmsdescribedin the literaturecannotbe usedfor
detectinganomaliesin (near)realtime.
Datamanagementandretrieval have alsobecomeinterestingproblems.Warrenderet
al. compareddifferentalgorithmsfor analysisof systemcallsandconcludedthat“perhaps
a disproportionateamountof attentionhasbeendirectedto the datamodelingproblem,
and that equalattentionshouldbe paid to consideringwhat are the mosteffective data
streamsto monitor”[43, p.145].
Finally, althoughanumberof applicationshavebeenimplementedto gatherdatafrom
the executionof an MPI programvia library interposition(Rabenseifner[30],Vetterand
Supinski[41] amongothers),noneweredevelopedwith intrusiondetectionasanobjective.
We have createda flexible tool to collectdatausefulnot only for our anomalydetection
framework, but alsofor theresearchcommunityin thefield of anomalydetection.
1.2 Hypothesisand main goals
We want to demonstratethat sequencesof function calls canbe usedto verify the
correctexecutionof anMPI parallelprogramin aclusterof Linux workstations.
Themaingoalsof this researchare:
5
1. Deploy ananomalydetectorin aclusterof workstationsableto verify thecorrectex-
ecutionof parallelapplicationswritten in theC/MPI language.Thisdetectorshould
beaccurateandproducelow overhead.
2. Compareandcontrastthedetectionrateandtheperformanceof differentmachine
learningalgorithmsfor theanomalydetectiontaskusingfunctioncall tracesof paral-
lel programs.Functioncallsarecapturedusinganinterpositionlibrary mechanism.
3. Generateanddocumentanew datasetfor theIDS community.
1.3 Organization
Theremainderof this documentis organizedasfollows:
  ChapterII presentsasurvey of algorithmsandconceptsusedin this research.
  ChapterIII providesabrief analysisof MPIguard.
  ChapterIV describesthreealgorithmsusedfor anomalydetection.
  ChapterV shows theaccuracy andperformanceof ouroffline detectionalgorithms.
  ChapterVI presentsMPIguardin onlinemode.





An intrusiondetectionsystem(IDS) is an importantcomponentof thecomputerand
informationsecurityframework,andits maingoalis to differentiatebetweennormalactiv-
itiesof asystemandbehavior thatcanbeclassifiedassuspiciousor intrusive. Generally, it
consistsof asetof sensors,asetof analyzersandauserinterface[1]. An IDS canbeclas-
sifiedgiventhemethodusedto detecttheintrusionasananomalybasedor misusebased
detectionsystem[37]. An anomalydetectionsystemassumesthat an intrusionmodifies
the systembehavior from its normalpattern. This approachcanusestatisticalmethods,
sequenceanalysisor predictive patterngenerationamongothers. In a misusedetection
system,theIDS assumesthatanintrusioncanbedetectedby matchingthecurrentactivity
with asetof intrusivepatterns(generallydefinedbysecurityexpertsor “underground”web
sites).Examplesof methodsusedfor misusedetectionincludeexpertsystems,keystroke
monitoring,andlook-uptablesfor state-transitionanalysis.
Othersclassificationsincludethetypeof architectureof theIDS: centralizedor decen-
tralized[37], the level of thedetection:application,host,network, or multinetwork; and
thetime in which theintrusionis detected:offline or online[1].
6
7
Theaccuracy of anIDS dependsnotonly onthealgorithmused,but alsoonthequality
of thedatausedfor trainingandtesting.Thecreationof suchdatais not aneasytask,be-
causeit involvesa knowledgeof networking,operatingsystems,programminglanguages
andinformationsecurity. Thegenerationof normaldata(attackfree)dependson system
wide featuressuchasthe topologyandarchitectureof thenetwork, thenumberandtype
of hosts,users,etc.Thus,oneof thefirst stepsto createacompletedatasetis to definethe
bestwayto gatherrepresentativedataof thesystembeingstudied.For instance,in orderto
createdatafor theDARPA-MIT intrusiondetectionevaluationthreedifferentapproaches
wereconsidered[4]: 1
1. CollectrealoperationalAir Forcenetwork traffic.
2. Preprocessrealtraffic changingsensitivedata
3. Createan abstractmodelof the traffic to generatenormalandattackpatternson a
privatenetwork (this lastapproachwasusedfor the1998and1999evaluations).
Anotherwell-known dataset for (host-based)intrusiondetectionwascreatedat the
Universityof New Mexico [12]. This repository2 containsrealandsyntheticexecutions
of differentUNIX programs,with someintrusionssuchasbuffer overflows,symboliclink







The processof verifying a program’s behavior canbe doneat compilationtime or
executiontime. At compilationtime (staticchecking),theflow andpropertiesof thealgo-
rithm areverifiedtakinginto accounta setof rulesrepresentingthehostpolicy (a typical
exampleis theJavaByte-CodeVerifier). On theotherhand,theruntimecheckerperforms
a verificationof all “dangerousmethods,” suchasnetwork connectionsandfiles accesses
while theprogramis beingexecuted.
2.2.1 Certifiedcode
Certified codeis the methodusedto verify securitypropertiesof untrustedsource
code.Beforerunningtheapplication,“thehostchecksannotationsandprovesthatthey im-
ply thehost’ssecuritypolicies” [42, p.1]. Examplesof certifiedcodeincludetheJavaVir-
tual Machine(JVM), Efficient CodeCertification(ECC),andProof-carryingcode(PCC)
[42]. However, thosemethodsconcentrateexclusively on standardsafetyproperties.On
theotherhand,systemslike theWalker’s SecureAutomata[42] canapplyany policy (de-
scribedin termsof statesandtransitions)atcompilationtime. Afterwards,theverification
modulein this architecturecheckstheresultingcodeandlinks theprogramwith therest
of theapplication.
As anexample,Figure2.1(takenfrom Walker[42]) showsasinglepolicy for aremote





Java containsa large setof securityfeaturesthat allow a hostto run remoteclasses
(and local ones)without risk. Basically, the Java SecurityModule is composedof the
Byte-CodeVerifier, the Applet ClassLoaderandthe SecurityManager. The Byte-Code
Verifier is a staticprocessthat validatesthe untrustedcodebeforeit is executed. Also,
Java is a type-safelanguage:“the compilerensuresthat methodsandprogramsdo not
accessmemoryin waysthat areinappropriate”[26] . The Applet ClassLoaderandthe
SecurityManagerhandletheexecutionof theappletat runtime.In Figure2.2(takenfrom
SunMicrosystems[26]) wecanseethattheJavacompilercreatestrustedbyte-codein the
local host,whereasthe Byte-CodeVerifier checksthe untrustedcode. Then, the applet







Janusis a set of tools that allows the executionof Linux processesin a restricted
environment[14]. Sucha restrictionis definedby securitypolicieswritten by thesystem
administrator, and its main objective is to disallow harmful systemcalls. Janusis built
upon the following assumption:“An applicationcan do little harm if its accessto the
underlyingoperatingsystemis appropriatelyrestricted”[14,p.1] . Thepolicy modulesare
dynamicallyloadedat runtime.Thus,eachhost,useror evenapplicationcanbeassigned
adifferentpolicy. An exampleof asecuritypolicy is:
1. Theapplicationcannotexecutechdir (changedirectory).
2. Accesspathscontainingthestring“..” aredenied.
3. The applicationcanreadsomegenericfiles, like sharedlibrariesor configuration
files,but accessto otherfiles is restricted.
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Janusitself is intendedto besecure,becausethedesignandthe implementationis based
on simplicity, and the whole Janusarchitecturehaslessthat 4500 lines of code,anda
detailedcodereview canbedoneto assureasecure(trusted)environment.
2.2.4 Executionmonitor
The ExecutionMonitor restrictsthe executionof privileged programs-thosewith
the ability to bypassthe kernel’s securitymechanisms,like sendmailor finger [19]. For
eachtarget program,a policy (a databaseof logical expressions)is definedto allow and
disallow differentsystemcalls. Thetraceof a programproducedby theoperatingsystem
(usingtracing tools llik e the SunBSM log) is transformedinto logical expressionsthat
arecomparedwith thepolicy in real time. If thesystemfindsa mismatch,a violation is
reported.
2.3 Monitoring a cluster of computers
A large collection of tools available to monitor the behavior of a clusterof work-
stationshasbeendesignedto analyzenetwork information. Although networking is the
mostcritical componentin a high-performancecomputer, monitoringthecommunication
amongworkstationsis not enoughto describethesystembehavior. “Also, unlike in gen-
eralpurposenetworks,in mostclustersetupsit is possible-andworthy- to install custom
agentsin thenodes”[2, p.59].
12
Typical intrusiondetectionsystemsfacetheproblemof largedatavolumedueto the
speedof communicationandprocessors.This situationoftencausesthenumberof false
positive andfalsenegative alarmsto becomeunacceptablyhigh. The possibility of de-
tectingan intrusion in suchan environmentin real time is a difficult task. In addition,
thegenerationof usefulinformationmayrequirecomputationalresourcesthatthecluster
could spendon otherstasks. For that reason,the definition of the level andthe correct
representationof thedatathatshouldbegenerated(andstored)for theIDS is a complex
problem.
Interpositionlibrary techniques(discussedin somedetail in the following chapters)
hasbeenusedsuccessfullyto monitorMPI (MessagePassingInterface)programs.Some
of the implementationstry to detecttypical programmingerrorsin MPI, whereasothers
usethis techniqueto createlogs andstatisticalreports. For instance,Umpire “monitors
theMPI operationsof anapplicationby interposingitself betweentheapplicationandthe
MPI runtimesystemusingtheMPI profiling layer” [41, p.1] . This tool checksfor specific
behavior patternsto detect,amongothers,deadlockandresourceexhaustion.Figure2.3
(takenfrom VetterandSupinski[41]) describesthis process.
Functioncalls from theMPI applicationarecapturedby the MPI profiling layer and
aretransmittedto a centralagent,theUmpireManger, via sharedmemoryto analyzeand
verify theexecutionof theparallelprogram.Thesharedmemorycorrespondsto aspecific





by usingtheconceptof aninterpositionlibrary to gatherthenumberof functioncalls,the
time spentandthe total numberof bytesat theendof a paralleljob. This informationis
storedin a file andit is usedto createstatisticalreportseachweekandmonth.Figure2.4
(takenfrom Rabenseifner[30]) showsthegeneralarchitectureof theAutomaticCounting
Profiling.
This tool is ableto gatherinformationsuchasnumberof processes,wall clock time






“A systemcall is usually a requestto the operatingsystem(kernel) to do a hard-
ware/systemspecificor privilegedoperation”[15] . Generallyit is implementedby using
thesyscall()low-level command,which acceptsasparametersthenumberof thesystem
call andits arguments.A UNIX-lik esystemhasmorethan150systemcalls.
Functionlibrariesarehigh-level implementationsof systemservices,allowing theexe-
cutionof languageprimitives,complex functionsandsystemcalls.Thus,wecanconsider
that thefunctioncalls from theC standardlibrary areplacedin a layerabove thedefined
systemcalls.Wealsocanassumethattheproblemsfacedby researchersanalyzingsystem
callsaresimilar to theproblemsencounteredwhenanalyzingfunctionscalls.
In the field of machinelearninganddatamining, many algorithmsareusedto solve
the problemof analysisof temporalsequencesof events. However, the brief discussion
presentedheredescribesonly someof thealgorithmsusedfor thesystemcall analysistask
in theintrusiondetectionarea.
ForrestandLongstaf [12] reportedoneof the first researchprojectstaking this ap-
proach. They usedsequencesof systemcalls within a window size (the length of the
sequence)to compareexact matchesbetweenthe normalprofile andthe new traceof a
process.This is known asthestidealgorithm.An extendedoverview is describedin [35].
Giventhefollowing traceof systemcalls(without parameters):
open,read,mmap,mmap,open,read,mmap
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This informationis storedin a treestructureandcorrespondsto the databaseof normal
behavior. Whena new (unseen)sequenceis presented,the systemtries to find it in the
tree.If it is not foundin thetree,acounterof anomaliesis increased.If thisvalueexceeds
auserthreshold,analarmis fired. An additionalmeasureto detectananomalyin thestide
algorithmis thedifferencebetweentheabnormalsequence(i.e. not presentedin thetree)
andthenormalones.This canbeachievedfinding theminimal Hammingdistance[12].
An improvementover thestidealgorithmis t-stidealgorithm: it storesthe frequency for
eachsequencein the database.Then,rarely matchedsequences(for instancesequences
with a frequency of 0.001%)in the datapresentedto the systemwill be alsolabeledas
anomalous[12]. Anotherfrequency-basedalgorithmis theEMERALDsystem[29], where
themodelcomparesshort-termfrequencieswith thedatabaseof historicaldistribution.
Somayaji[33] extendssomeof this conceptsto createpH, asystemableto detectand
respondto changesin sequencesof systemcalls.Whenanprocessis behaving unusually,





Markov processesarewidely usedto modelsystemsin termsof statetransitions.Some
intrusiondetectionalgorithmsthatexploit theMarkov propertyimplementHiddenMarkov
Models(HMM), Markov chains,andsparseMarkov trees.Lane[38] usedHMMs to pro-
filer useridentitiesfor the anomalydetectiontask. An openproblemwith this profiling
techniqueis the ability to selectappropiatemodelparameters.Othersexperimentsper-
formedby Warrender, ForrestandPearlmutter[43] comparedtheHMM with algorithms
suchass-tideandRIPPER.They concludedthattheHiddenMarkov Model exhibitedthe
bestperformanceof themodelsconsideredbut wasthemostcomputationallyexpensive.
Eskinet al. [8] constructeda probabilisticpredictionmodelableto determinethelast
systemcall of a givensequenceby usingsparseMarkov trees.An importantcontribution
of this work is the useof information theory to find the minimum entropy of the data
set.Experimentalresultsshowedthatthesystemachievesthebestperformanceusingthe
minimumentropy to computethevalueof thewindow size.
Oneof the mostwidely usedrule-basedalgorithmsin the intrusiondetectionfield is
the RepeatedIncrementalPruningto ProduceError Reduction(RIPPER) [3]. This is a
rule learningsystemdevelopedby William Cohen.His algorithmperformsclassification
by creatinga list of rulesfrom asetof labeledtrainingexamples.RIPPERalsois usedfor
anomalydetectionby LeeandStolfo [23] to predictsystemcalls,wheretheclassification
labelof eachtrainingexamplecorrespondsto thelastcall of thesequence.Eachgenerated




whereM correspondsto thenumberof recordsthatsatisfiestherule’sconditions,andT is
thenumberof timesthepredictionof therule wascorrected.If a new (unseen)sampleis
presentedto thesystemandviolateshigh-confidencerules(for instance,with aconfidence
greaterthan80%)thesampleis labeledasananomaly.
The sameconceptof predictionof sequencecalls canbe implementedusingneural
networks [20]. Themainadvantagesof suchanapproacharethe lack of dependenceon
any statisticalassumption,noisetolerance,andabstraction.
In previous work [24] we have successfullyapplied threedifferent neuralnetwork
topologies(multilayer perceptrontrained with backpropagation,radial basisfunctions
trainedwith aperceptronandself-organizingmaps)to detectattacksonwell-knownUNIX
programs,suchaslpr andsendmail. Multiple self-organizingmapshavealsobeenfor used
network intrusiondetectionin [32].
We have demonstrated[10, 11] that theaccuracy of suchneuralnetworkscanbe im-
provedby applyingAdaboost(aboostingby resamplingtechnique).In someexperiments
we wereableto improve theclassificationrateby 15%or more,achieving in somecases
100%accuracy in thedetectionof anomalies.
Finally, Wespietal. [44] presentanintrusiondetectionsystemusingpatternmatching
with fixed andvariablelengthsequences.The first methodusesa static table to try to
find anexact(or similar) matchof thenew sequence,whereasthelastmethodusesa tree
to storeeachnormalpattern,taking into accountthatseveralpatternsstartwith thesame
string. The intrusiondetectiondescribedin their work executesfiltering, reductionand
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aggregationof the sequences(for the experiments,they usedaudit eventsfrom the FTP
daemon).Their resultsshow that theconceptof variablelengthsequencesimprovesthe
IDS accuracy.
2.5 Processmonitoring
Operatingsystemsgive theuserseveral toolsto control theexecutionof a processin
real-time. We areinterestedin the implementationof a dynamiclibrary to collect infor-
mationfrom functioncalls,but othersmechanismscanbeusedto achievesuchagoal.
2.5.1 Library interposition
Thelink editor(ld) in aLinux operatingsystembuildsdynamicallylinkedexecutables
(althoughit canalsobuild staticallylinkedprograms).Building “incomplete”executables,
thelink editorallows theincorporationof differentobjectsin real time. Thecommunica-
tion betweenthe main programand the objectsis doneby sharedmemoryoperations.
Such(shared)objectsarecalleddynamiclibraries: “A dynamiclibrary consistsof a set
of variablesandfunctionswhich arecompiledand linked togetherwith the assumption
thatthey will besharedby multiple processesimultaneouslyandnot redundantlycopied
into eachapplication”[5, p.1]. Thedynamiclibrary is linkedwithout anentrypoint (i.e.
withoutaninclusionof theprogramprologuecrt0) [13]. In otherwords,adynamiclibrary




Generally, theusercompilesthis programwith acommandlike this:
cc -o hello hello.c
Sucha commandline invokes:
ld -e Start-dc -dp -o hello /lib/crt0.o hello.o-lc
The ld commandcreatesan incompletehello executable,requiring the inclusionof
theC standardlibrary, libc.so.V(V is thecurrentversion)at executiontime. Whenprintf
is executed,ld.so, the execution-timelinker, searchesin the symbol table of the hello
applicationandthenthe libc.so library for thedefinitionof any commandnamed”printf”
with the sameparameters.Becausethis is a standardC function,printf from the libc.so
library is executed.Afterwards,theexecution-timeenvironmentsavesa pointerwith the
referenceof sucha functionto avoid searchingagain[13].
In a Linux system,the link editor usesthe LD PRELOAD environmentvariableto
searchfor theuser’s dynamiclibraries[5]. Usingthis feature,theoperatingsystemgives
the userthe option of interposinga new library. Interpositionis “the processof placing
a new or differentlibrary function betweenthe applicationandits referenceto a library
function” [5]. Thus, the library interpositiontechniqueallows interceptingthe function
callswithout themodificationor recompilationof thedynamicallylinkedtargetprogram.
By default the C compilersin LINUX usedynamiclinking. Furthermore,“most parts
of the Linux libc packageareunderthe Library GNU Public License,thoughsomeare
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undera specialexceptioncopyright like crt0.o. For commercialbinarydistributionsthis
meansarestrictionthatforbidsstaticallylinkedexecutables”[15]. Theuserfunctions(i.e.
the functionsinsidethe interpositionlibrary with thesameprototypeasthe “real” ones)
areableto check,recordandevenmodify theargumentsandtheresponseof theoriginal
functioncall. Otheradvantagesinclude[5]:
1. A subsetof thelibrary canbeprofiledinsteadof thewholelibrary.
2. Dif ferentlevelsof profiling canbegenerated.
3. Nestinglevelsinsidethelibrary canbecontrolled.
Themaindisadvantageof theinterpositionlibrary techniqueis thatit canbebypassed
by calling functionsat a lower level (for instance,executingsystemcall interruptions)
[17]. Theprocessof searchingfor thesymboltablein thenew interpositionlibrary andthe
allocationof memorydoesincreasetheexecutiontimeof thetargetprocess.As anexam-
ple,KupermanandSpaford ([21]) presentsomeexperimentsthatshow thatfunctionsnot
definedin the sharedlibrary areslowedby 340 nanoseconds,whereasfunctionsdefined
areslowedby 6.53microsecondsonaRedHat Linux 5.2machine.
Theinterpositionlibrary technologyis widely usedandmany wrappersandtoolshave
beenimplemented.Curry [5] shows an applicationof this techniquein detail with the
SharedLibrary Interposer(SLI) library. In his work, Curry describesthe new problems
thatarisebecauseof the interceptionof calls from the libc.so. As anexample,the inter-




UNIX andLinux operatingsystemsprovide a largecollectionof mechanismsto trap
systemand function calls from any process. For instance,to monitor kernel calls, the
OSprovidesthetoolsstrace, traceandtruss[21]. However they only recordkernellevel
functions,andthetrapmechanismproducestoomuchoverhead[5].
Interceptionof systemcalls canbe built insidethe OS kernelby addingcodeexten-
sions.This allows low interceptionoverheadandspeed(usedfor real-timeapplications),
but thesystemitself is “lesssecure”by addingextensions,andtheimplementationrequires
super-userprivileges(it requireskernelmodification),so it will affect any processin the
upperlayersof theOS[17].
By using the ptrace()specialsystemcall a target processcan be monitoredby an-
otherprogram.Whenthekernelreadsa systemcall from thetargetprogram,themonitor
awakesandtakescontrol. Beforethekernelprocessesthecall, themonitorcando a pre-
call process[14]. After thesystemcall is executedby thekernel,it is ableto doapost-call
process.ThemonitoringprocesscanextendLinux (andotherPOSIXsystem)capabilities
to modify systemcall dataandit is consideredvery efficient. However, overheadis re-
quiredto provide a securemonitoringprocess,andptrace()tracesevery systemcall, not
just theinterestingones.Also in many operatingsystemsit is impossibleto abortasystem
call without killing the processbeingmonitored[14]. A similar monitoringmechanism
canbeimplementedwith the /proc interfaceinsteadof ptrace()[14].
CHAPTERIII
SYSTEMOVERVIEW
We presentMPIguard,a new architectureto verify the correctexecutionof parallel
programs(written in C/MPI) over a Linux clusterby monitoring library calls issuedin
eachhost.Thesystemis designedasahost-basedanomalydetectorsimilar to sandboxing
architectures. It is ableto controlin (near)real-timeaprocessbeingexecuted.
A programmight violate thepolicy of thesystem(storedasa databaseof legal traces




4. Failureof clustercomponents(suchasnetworkingor disk failures).
Modification of a program’s sourcecodeis very unlikely in a “closed” clusterenvi-
ronment,wherethesecuritypoliciesof one(or more)centralnodescontrol theaccessof
theusersto thecluster. Therisk of corruptedMPI programsis higherfor “enterprise”or
“non dedicated”clusters,whereeachnodeis ableto connectto theInternetto accessare-
motedatabaseor a remoteservice.However, weassumethatanunauthorizedusercannot
modify MPIguardby changingsetupfilesor removing components.
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MPIguardusesan interpositionlibrary techniqueto storeon disk the function calls
from thestandardC andtheMPI/PRO libraries(althoughmany otherscanbeprofiled)in
a Linux node.This tracefile representsthenormalbehavior of eachoneof theMPI pro-
gramsthat thesystemadministratorwantsto control. Somayajidefinesnormalbehavior
as“behavior that is observedwhenwe arereasonablycertainno activity is occurringthat
requiresnon-routinedirecthumanadministrativeobservationandinteraction”[33, p.92].
Notethat this definitionof normalbehavior includesnot only security-relatedevents,but
alsomisconfigurationsandfailuresin thesystem.
When an MPI programis being executed,the currentsequenceof function calls is
comparedwith thenormaltraceof theprogram.If MPIguarddetectsthat theprogramis
behaving unusuallyanalarmis fired.
It is importantto note that our systemcanbe adaptedto includeseveral policy and
recovery rules,like theonepresentedin Figure3.1. In this exampleany memoryrequest





(SPMD)paradigm,i.e. thesameprogramis executedin all thenodesof thecluster. This
impliesthattheanomalydetectorin eachoneof thenodesof theclusteris trainedwith the
samedataset1. However, a parallelapplicationrunningdifferentprocessesin eachnode
(noSPMD)couldbemonitoredwith MPIguardby usinga tracefile for eachof thenodes.
3.1 A testenvir onment
MPIguardwasimplementedandtestedwith a Linux clusterbuilt at MississippiState
University in the ComputerScienceDepartment. This clustercontainsone headnode
(microcosm0) and8 slaves,eachwith 4 processors.The nodesarefully connectedwith
EthernetandGiganet(high-speed)networks.Figure3.2showsthis architecture.
3.2 Inter position library
This library capturesfunction calls (with their parameters)from a MPI/PRO exe-
cutable.It performstwo mainprocesses:
1. Sendinformationaboutthefunctionto theProfiler andtheAnalyzer.
2. Executethefunction.
MPIguardautomaticallygeneratesthesourcecodeneededto gatherinformationfrom any
function.Figure3.3showsthetemplateusedto generatethecodefor any MPI/C function.




rameterswill beanalyzed.Basically, a configurationfile is usedto describethetype,the
nameandtheparametersof thefunctions.Figure3.4showsanexampleof this file. Code
is an internalcodefor eachfunction(this valueis storedon disk insteadof therealname
of thefunction)andParameterto store in disk is theparameter(an integerthatgenerally
correspondsto somebuffer’s size) that will be written in the log file. A valueof -1 in-
dicatesthat the function’s parameteris not importantfor the useror the function hasno
parameters.
Using the templatedescribedin Figure3.3 andthe informationof MPI Sendin Fig-
ure3.4,MPIguardis ableto generatethesourcecodeshown in Figure3.5.
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Figure3.3Templatefor any MPI or C functionin MPIguard






aboutthe systemcalls. Its main goal is to storethe program’s normalbehavior on disk,
althoughit canbeusedto generatethe traceof any MPI/C program.This featureallows
storingthetracesof differentexecutionsof thesameprogramfor off-line analysis.
Figure3.6shows theinteractionbetweentheProfiler andthetargetprocessusingthe
interpositionlibrary. As we cansee,the interpositionlibrary sendsinformation in real
time to theProfiler via sharedmemory.
Figure3.6 InteractionbetweentargetprocessandProfiler
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An exampleof theProfiler’soutputcanbeseenin Figure3.7. It is anASCII file con-
tainingtheprocessidentifier(PID), theinternalcodeof thefunctioncall andtheoptional
integerparameter.
Figure3.7Exampleof theProfiler’soutput
As wasmentionedbefore,includinga new library doesincreasetheexecutiontime of
theprocess.We have executedLLCbench[27], a parallelperformancebenchmarkimple-
mentedin the University of Tennesseeat Knoxville, to measurethe overheadproduced
by theinterpositionlibrary andtheProfiler. We have used4 processorsandaveragedthe
resultsof 20experiments.
Figure3.8shows thelatency of MPI Send(functionthatsendsa messageto onepro-
cessorandblocks the currenttaskuntil the messageis received ) with differentpacket
sizes.Smallpacketsresultin anoverheadof a few microsecondsandfor largepacketsthe
overheadis almostimperceptible.
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Figure3.8Comparisonof latency with theLLCbenchbenchmark
Figure3.9 shows theaveragebandwidthbetweenthemasterandoneslave processor
usingunidirectionaltransmissions.For smallpackets(up to 1024bytes)theshapeof the
graphof thebenchmarkrun without the interpositionlibrary indicatesa somewhatbetter
bandwidthandfor largepacketsthereductionin thebandwidthis verycloseto 0.
Dif ferentinformationcanbeextractedfrom thelog filesgeneratedby ourProfiler tool,
andit canbe usedfor performancemonitoringor debugging. For example,Figure3.10






The Analyzeris the principal componentof MPIguardandits position in the MPI-
guardarchitectureis illustratedin Figure3.11.Thisapplicationis trainedwith thecurrent
executable’snormalbehavior (generatedby theProfiler).
Figure3.11Onlineanalysisof thetargetprocess
WhenMPIguardis running,theinterpositionlibrary sendssequencesof functioncalls
to theAnalyzerin real-time,andtheAnalyzercomparesthecurrenttracewith theprofile
storedondiskfor theprogramthatisbeingexecuted.If thesequencesarebeingrecognized
assuspiciousactivities,analarmis fired. In ChapterIV wewill explainthealgorithmsthat
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wehaveusedto detectdeviationsfrom normalbehavior of parallelprogramsin thenodes
of aLinux cluster.
3.5 Networking
If the anomalydetectoris being executedin real time in eachnodeof the cluster
(i.e. the interpositionlibrary andtheAnalyzerarerunning),MPIguardcancollectall the
processstatusinformationat a giventime andpresentit to thesystemadministratorasan
”overall” stateof the system. This communicationwould not dramaticallyincreasethe
normalnetwork traffic in thecluster.
3.6 Adding newcomponents
Eachcomponentin theMPIguardsystemcanbeseenasasoftwareagent.TheProfiler
andthe Analyzercouldpotentiallyreceive informationfrom otherapplications,not only
the instanceof the interpositionlibrary being executed. Suchagentsmight be able to
monitor CPU usage,authenticationsandnetworking. Several architecturesusingagents
for intrusiondetectionsaredescribedin theliterature(e.g.[16, 34]).
CHAPTERIV
ANOMALY DETECTIONWITH FUNCTIONCALLS
Severalalgorithmscanbeimplementedto find patternsfrom a processusinginforma-
tion aboutits function calls (for example,by comparingtimings or relative frequencies,
or analyzingtheparameters[33]). In our research,we areusingHiddenMarkov Models
andsequencematchingto detectabnormalprogrambehavior usingonly the type of the
functioncall andits relativeorderin a trace.
4.1 Hidden Mark ov Models
HiddenMarkov Models(HMM) areusedfor modelingsequencesof eventsandare
widely usedfor speechrecognitionandDNA sequencing.
4.1.1 Description
“A HiddenMarkov Model describesa doublystochasticprocess.An HMM’ s states
representsomeunobservableconditionof thesystembeingmodeled.In eachstate,there
is a certainprobabilityof producingany of theobservablesystemoutputsanda separate
probability indicatingthe likely next states”[43, p.135]. Figure4.1 (adaptedfrom [31]
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shows anergodic1 HMM with 4 states.In eachstatethereis a probabilityof observation
for eachof theelementsof thealphabeta,b,c,dande.
Figure4.1An ergodicHiddenMarkov Modelwith 4 statesand5 symbols
Theelementsof anHMM are[31]:
1. N, thenumberof states.
2. M, thenumberof distinctobservationsymbolsperstate(thealphabetsize).
3. A, thestatetransitionprobabilitydistribution.
4. B, theobservationsymbolprobabilitydistribution.




Rabiner[31] describesthreedifferentproblemsthat must be solved with an HMM
whenwehaveanobservationsequence 
  !"$# :
1Everystatecanbereachedfrom any otherstate.
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1. How dowe compute%&')(+*-, ?
2. How dowe choosethestatesequencethatbestexplain ' ?
3. How dowe maximize%&')(.*/, adjusting*0&214353768, ?
4.1.2 TheBaum-Welch algorithm
TheBaum-Welchalgorithmis generallyusedto train thetransitionandsymbolprob-
abilitiesof anHMM [31] (attemptingto solve problem3). This is an iterative algorithm
that computesA, B and 6 basedon the conceptof forward-backward probabilities. The
forwardprocedurefindstheprobabilityof thepartialobservationsequencefrom thefirst
event to someeventO(t) at time t, whereasthebackwardprocedurefinds theprobability
of thepartialobservationfrom O(t+1) to theend.
Theforwardvariablecanbedefinedas
9;: &<=,>0?%@&A'B'CD!D!DE' : 3GF : 0IHJ<K(+*-, (4.2)
It correspondsto theprobabilityof thepartialobservationsequenceO until time t andstate
H/L at time t, giventhemodel * .
Thebackwardvariableis theprobabilityof thepartialobservationfrom t+1 to theend,
giventhestateH/L at time t andthemodel * , andit canbeexpressedas
M : &<=,>0?%@&A' :!N B' :!N CD!D!DE'$OP( F : 0QH/LR3S*/, (4.3)
TheBaum-Welchalgorithmupdatesthemodel * usingtheprobabilityof beingin state
H/L at time t andstateHUT at time t+1, giventhemodelandtheobservations.This variable,
V : &<73XWY, is illustratedin Figure4.2(takenfrom [31]).
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Figure4.2Reestimationof theHMM modelusinga joint event
With Z we cancomputetheprobabilityof beingin state [/\ at time t giventhemodel
andobservationsequence
]_^`a=b>cedfGg/h Z `2aGiXjYb (4.4)
Theinitial statedistributioncanbecomputedastheexpectedfrequency (numberof times)
in state[/\ at time k cml
n \ co] h `2aXb (4.5)
Thestatetransitionprobabilitydistribution is givenby theexpectednumberof transitions
from thestate[/\ to state[ f dividedby theexpectednumberof transitionsfrom state[/\
p \ f crq ^ g/h Z ^`2aGiXjYbq ^ g/h ]_^sa (4.6)
Theobservationsymbolprobabilitydistributioncanbecomputedastheexpectednumber
of timesin statej andobservingsymbol tvu dividedby theexpectednumberof timesin
statej
w \ `RxUbyc q z|{}~ ^ K z g
]Y^` jYb
q ^ g/h ]_^7` jYb (4.7)
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Thus, 2GXY canbecomputedusingthenew valuesof X . and AU . This processis
repeatedseveraltimesuntil somelimiting point is reached.
4.1.3 Anomalydetectionwith HMMs
In order to train the HMM with the Baum-Welch algorithm,we shouldspecify the
observationsequenceO. This is NT, thefunctioncall traceof thenormalMPI/C program
producedby the profiler. No further preprocessingshouldbe done. With an optimal
model  , we canassumethattheprobabilitiesA andB generalizethenormalbehavior of
theprocess.
Givena new observation  (thatcorrespondsto thetraceof anunseeninstanceof the
MPI/C program,namedUT), wecanapplythefollowing algorithm[43]:
1. Usingthemodel 
2. For eachoneof theobservations$ .
 For eachoneof thestates/ (if thestatecanbereachedfrom thepreviousone,
i.e., if theprobabilityof moving to thecurrentstateis greaterthansomeuser
threshold ) .
- If theprobabilityof producingthesymbol $ in thecurrentstate7 $
is lessthan  thenthefunctioncall in thetraceUT is labeledasanomalous If $ could not be producedby any state(i.e. the function call in the trace
wastaggedasanomalousin eachstate/ ) thenthecounterof anomaliesC is
increased.
3. If C exceedssomeuserthreshold thentheentiretraceUT is taggedasanomalous.
Althoughit couldbesaidthatcomparingtheprobabilityof moving to thecurrentstate
/ andthe probability of producinga symbol $ in the currentstatewith the sameuser
threshold hasno mathematicalfoundation,we wantedinitially to includethe smallest
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numberof parametersthat we could conceive for the anomalydetectiontask with the
HMM.
Figure4.3showsanexampleof anergodicHMM with two statesand3 possiblesym-
bols. Using the algorithmdescribedbefore,with  ¡E¢ and £¤r , Figure4.4 shows
that thetraceCAAC couldbeproducedby thatHMM, sincethereis at leastonepossible
stateproducingevery symbol ¥$¦ . For instance,in stepiii. , A could not be producedin
state1, but it couldbeproducedin state2 with aprobabilityof 0.4.
Figure4.3Exampleof a trainedHMM model
An improvementonthisalgorithmcountsthenumberof abnormalfunctioncallsusing
sometolerancefactor § . If the numberof abnormalfunction calls betweenthe current
observation ¥$¦ andthelast § observationsis equalto § , thenthecounterof anomaliesC is
increased.Thisconceptis similar to thelocality framecountLFC, usedby Somayaji[33],
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Figure4.4CAAC is not taggedasanomalousby theHMM
wherethemain ideais to countthenumberof anomaliesin the last LF calls to estimate
thedelayneededto penalizethesystemcallsof theanomalousprocess.
As an example,if ¨ is 20, andwe have only detected5 anomaliesin the last 20 ob-




ior andsecurityviolationsof a program.
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4.2.1 Description
We usedthe sliding window conceptthat is widely usedin the analysisof system
calls [12, 35, 33, 24, 10, 11] to createsubsequencesof the function calls of an MPI/C
application. The sliding window dividesa traceof N function calls into a setof small
sequences,eachoneof length © (the window size). As an exampleseein Figure4.5 a
programtrace.With ©«ªI¬ thefirst sequencecanbeobtainedwith positions1, 2 and3 in
the trace.Thesecondsequencecorrespondsto positions2, 3 and4. The third is created




Somayajihascreateda formal definition of thesesubsequences[33]. Let ­ be the
alphabetof possiblesystemcalls, ®¯ª±° ­²° , ³eªm´µ·¶G´¸¶º¹¹¹º¶7´X»¼° ´X½>¾¿­ , À thelengthof T, ©
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thewindow size( ÁÂIÃmÂÅÄ ), Æ theprofile (setof patternsassociatedwith Ç and Ã ). A
sequenceÆÉÈAÊAË is definedas
ÆÌÈÊRËÎÍmÏPÐRÑÒ7ÓSÑºÔÖÕ/×SÓØºØØºÓSÑÙ·ÚÜÛYÑºÔ=ÓSÑºÔÖÕ/×SÓºØØØºÓÑSÙÞÝ¤ßàÓºÁàÂáÒ7ÓXâ@ÂáãÓXâä¿Ò/åæÁ$ÍáÃçÓºè (4.8)
This databasecanbestoredasa sortedtreeto performefficient comparisons.Figure4.7
showsanexampleof aprofilewith awindow of length4.
Figure4.7Normalbehavior representedby a sortedtree
4.2.2 Anomalydetectionwith sequencematching
With exact matching,if a sequenceé Íëê é/ÔRÓ é/ÔÖÕ/×SÓºØ Ø!Ø Ó éUÙ²ì (from the unseentrace
UT) is not containedin ÆÉÈAÊAË , thesequenceé is taggedasanomalous.Researchershave
demonstratedthat this methodis very efficient andit is ableto detectsecurityviolations
andsoftwarefailures[33, 35,43,12]. Somemodificationof this methodinclude:
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1. ComputetheHammingdistancebetweenthenew sequencesí andeachoneof the
sequenceof îÌïðRñ [35].
2. Computethe frequency of eachsequencein îÉïAðRñ . If the sequenceí (from UT)
matcheswith asequencein îÌïðRñ with verylow frequency, í is still taggedasanoma-
lous[43].
3. Computethemismatchesratepersequence[12]. It is importantto observe thatthe
numberof anomaliesreportedby thesequencematchingdetectionalgorithmmight
exceedthenumberof abnormalfunctioncalls.
As an exampletake a profile containingsequencesof length3 createdwith all the
possiblecombinationsof thealphabeta,b,c,d,e. Whenanew tracesuchasabXdeis
comparedwith theprofile, thesequencesabX,bXd,Xdewill beflaggedasanoma-
lous.However, theonly anomaloussymbolis X 2.
Themaximumnumberof mismatchesfor asequenceof lengthL andwindow k is
òôóõ÷öøòUù;ú?óRòûöýüþù;úQóAòëö«ÿù;ú   úoü  òôóõ÷öæóRòàúoüùÿù (4.9)




The main goal of MPIguard is to detectdeviations of an MPI/C programfrom its
expectednormalbehavior, calledtheprofile. In orderto achievea(near)on-linedetection,
we first analyzedthe accuracy andefficiency of thealgorithmsdescribedin ChapterIV.
However we do not know, apriori, any decisionboundarybetweennormalandabnormal
instancesof MPI/C programs.
5.1 Datasets
We areusingMPIguard’s Profiler tool to gatherMPI function calls from two pro-
grams:IS (“IntergerSort”, includedin theNAS parallelbenchmarksuite[45]) andavery
simpleMPI programcalledring. It is importantto observe thatbothprogramssatisfythe
SPMDconstraintof MPIguard.
IS sortskeys in parallel with a problemsize of 	
 numbers. This programgen-
eratesa small trace consistingof about40 calls in eachnode using 9 function calls.
The ring applicationsendsmessagesfrom one processorto the next onedefinedin its
MPI COMM WORLD (default handlerfor MPI communication). The last processor
sendsa messageto the first one creatinga “closed ring“ architecture. This processis
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repeatedseveraltimes.Thisprogramgeneratesa largetracewith about6400callsin each
node,but usingonly 5 functioncalls.
Bothprogramswereexecutedusing4, 8 and16processorsin theLinux clusteratMis-
sissippiStateUniversity(Figure3.2). Thedetectionalgorithmswererun onanIntelx386,
64MB RAM with Linux Mandrake.
5.2 Artificial anomalies
UsingMPIGuard’sprofiler wecangeneratea traceof thefunctioncallsissuedby any
MPI/C program(Figure3.7). If we canassurethattheprogramis executedundernormal
conditions,we canusesuchtraceasa representationof the program’s normalbehavior
(profile).
5.2.1 Description
Assumingthatpossibleanomaliesof aMPI/C programwill generatepatternsthatare
similar to theprofile ([9, 22, 24]), a simplebut usefulheuristicthatcanbeusedto create
asynthetictracerepresentingabnormalbehavior is to randomlychangethevalueof some
of thecallsin the“normal” trace.Both thetypeof thesystemcall andits argumentcanbe
modified.
Torres[39] hasimplementedtwo programsthatinteractwith MPIguard’sProfiler files
to generatesyntheticdatasets.Bothprogramsreceiveasinputaconfigurationfile contain-
ing thesetof possiblefunctionsthatcanbegeneratedby theMPI/C program.Figure5.1
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shows anexampleof thecontentsof this file. It is a subsetof theProfiler’s configuration
file (Figure3.4).
Figure5.1Setof possiblefunctioncalls
Torresincludesin his programsrandomlib, a C library to generaterandomnumbers
basedon Fibonaccisequencesimplementedat FloridaStateUniversity [25]. This is one
of the bestalgorithmsto createrandomnumbers. The artificial anomaliesare created
eitherby modificationor by addition:
1. Modification: Thetypeof thefunctioncall (internalcode)is changedfor any other
valid codewith aprobability  (seeFigure5.1).
If the function call is going to be changed,the valueof its parameterwill alsobe
modifiedwith a probabilityof 0.5. Sincewe assumethatthevalueof theparameter
correspondsto thesizeof a transmissionor a buffer, thenew valueis a power of 2
lessthan65536.
If the function call doesnot change,thereis a probability of   of changingthe
valueof its parameter. Not all thefunctionshave parameters.If this is thecase,the
valueof theparameteris -1.
2. Addition: A new (valid) functioncall is createdwith a probability  andthevalue
of its parameteris generatedasa power of 2 lessthan65536. In order to create
morediversity, thevalueof theparametersof thefunctioncallsarechangedwith a
probabilityof 0.5.
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In our researchwe have generatedanomaliesusingtheadditionmethod.An example
canbeseenin Figure5.2.
Figure5.2Anomalydatagenerationwith addition
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of artificial anomaliesin patternspacethat were
injectedinto a datasetcontaininga traceof the normal executionof ring in one node.
Thex-axiscorrespondsto theidentifierof thefunctioncall, they-axiscorrespondsto the
positionin thetraceandthez-axisshowsthesizeof theparameterthatwasstoredondisk
by theProfiler. Althoughwedonotbelievethatrealdeviationsfrom anMPI/C program’s
profile containsucha high numberof anomalies,the artificial anomalygeneratorusing
additionhelpsusto demonstratetheability of detectionof our IDS.
Both IS andring wereexecutedwith 4 processors.Selectingany two processorsother
than the masternode(rank=0) two datasets and  !"$# were generated.
Applying theartificial anomalygenerationalgorithmto  !"% and  !"$# wehave




As explainedin section4.1.3,anHMM - trainedwith a datasetrepresentingnormal
behavior of anMPI/C programcanbeusedasaprofile to detectanomalies.Detectionwith
thisalgorithmis veryefficientsincethetracegeneratedby theMPIguard’sProfiler canbe
useddirectlyasinput for thedetectionalgorithmwithoutpreprocessing.
By trainingtheHMM usingtheBaum-Welchalgorithmwe canobtainoptimalvalues
for . , / and 0 . However, we mustspecifythenumberof statesin themodelN andthe
thresholdfor detection1 (the minimum allowed probability of transitionbetweenstates
and the minimum allowed probability of producinga symbol)and 2 (the maximumal-
lowednumberof anomalousfunctioncallsin thetrace).WebelievedwecoulduseHMMs
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with few statesbecausethealphabetsizefor normalbehavior of ISandring is lessthan10.
Sincewe do not know of any usefulheuristicto determinethe parametersof themodel,
we conducteda setof experimentsto determinethe impactof 3 and 4 on the accuracy
of thedetection.Theresultsof theseexperimentsareplottedin graphs,wherethex-axis
correspondto theuserthreshold3 andthey-axiscorrespondto thepercentof anomalies
detectedin thetrace.
The overall shapeof the graphshelp us to determinethe capabilitiesof the HMM.
For example,in Figure5.4, theability of theHMM to representnormalbehavior canbe
describedas 576!8 whereX is the maximum 3 that canbe usedto distinguishbetween
normalandabnormalbehavior (when 3 is greaterthanX, severalfunctioncallsarelabeled
as anomalousno matterwhat trace is presentedto the HMM) and Y is the difference
betweenthenumberof anomaliesdetectedfor normalandabnormaltraceswhen 3 is lower
thanX. Y is relatedwith theaccuracy of theHMM andX is relatedwith its generalization
capability. If Y is small (closeto 0) theHMM is not ableto differentiatebetweennormal
andabnormalbehavior. If X is small,theprobabilitiesof thematricesA, B and 9 arevery
small.
It is importantto observe that the area5:6!8 givesus an ideaof the behavior of the
HMM, but it cannotbeusedto estimateits detectionaccuracy. In thenext chapterwewill




Figure5.5shows thenumberof anomaliesdetectedby thealgorithmusing ;<=>?@AB
for IS astraining datafor an HMM with 5 statesand CEDGFHDJILKC . When FHMNCK"O the
algorithmdetectsalmost100%percentof theanomaliesfor eachtrace,evenfor thetrain-
ing dataset; <=>?!@"A%B . Thus,thenumberof falsepositivesis overwhelming.However,
by using CK"PQDRFTSUCVKWO thereis a distinctionbetweennormalandabnormaltracesandby
selectinganappropriateX (e.g. XZYU[\C ) wecanaccuratelyclassifytheprogramtracewith
no falsepositivesor falsenegatives.
Figure5.6andFigure5.7show resultsfrom thesameexperimentwith 8 and40hidden
states.Increasingthenumberof statesdoesnotchangethedetectioncapabilityof ] .
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Figure5.5Detectinganomaliesof IS usinganHMM with 5 states
Figure5.6Detectinganomaliesof IS usinganHMM with 8 states
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Figure5.7Detectinganomaliesof IS usinganHMM with 40 states
Figure5.8andFigure5.9show thedetectionaccuracy usingtracesfrom thering pro-
gramwith 5 and8 states(we werenot ableto find ^ with 40 states).With thesemodelsX
is very large(above0.8)andby choosing_Z`Ua\b wecanachieveperfectaccuracy. Again,
increasingthenumberof statesseemsnot to affect therepresentationof normalbehavior
by theHMM.
Sincethe alphabetneededto representnormalbehavior of IS and ring containsfew
symbols,trainingtheHMM is not ascomputationallyexpensiveaswe would expect.For
ISwith asmalltracecontainingabout40callstheBaum-Welchalgorithmtakeslessthan1
secondwith 5 statesandlessthan2 secondswith 40 statesandFor ring with a largetrace
containingmorethan6000calls,theBaum-Welchalgorithmtakesunder240secondswith
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Figure5.8Detectinganomaliesof ring usinganHMM with 5 states
Figure5.9Detectinganomaliesof ring usinganHMM with 8 states
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5 statesandunder150secondswith 8 states.Testing(detection)usingthetrainedmodel
takeslessthan1 secondfor bothIS andring.
5.2.3 Sequencematching
Section4.2.2describedhow theprofile createdusingsliding windows canbeusedto
detectanomaliesin an MPI/C program(seeFigure4.7). Theonly parameterneededfor
suchan algorithmis thewindow size c . The following experimentswereconductedto
find the impactof c in thedetectionaccuracy of thebasicsequencematchingalgorithm.
Figure5.10showsthepercentof anomaliesin eachtracewhencomparingdifferenttraces
of ring with the profile d efgh!i"j%k using 4 window sizes. Note that we are including
the function call tracesof a third processor:def	gh!i"j$l and mon*p+ef	gh!i"j$l . The number
of anomaliesdetectedfor the traces def	gh!i"j$q and def	gh!i"j$l is 0 and the numberof
anomaliesdetectedfor the tracesmon$prefgh!i"j%k , m(n*p+ef	gh!i"j$q and mon*p+ef	gh!i"j$l is greater
than20%. Increasingthe sequencelengthin the algorithmdoesincreasethe numberof
anomaliesdetected.However we will seein the following chapterthat whenusing the
sequencematchingalgorithmwith real attacks,the window sizedoesnot have suchan
impacton thedetectionrate.
Figure5.11showstheresultsthesameexperimentusingIS traces.Thebehavior of the






Creatingthe profile usingsortedtreesis a very efficient task. The runningtime for
bothtrainingandtestingusingsequencematchingtakesunder1 secondfor bothring and
IS.
5.3 Real attacks
Section5.2 describeda simpleheuristicto insertartificial anomaliesin the function
call traceof an MPI programexecutedundernormalconditions. Although the datasets
createdwith thesemethodswereusefulto demonstratetheaccuracy andefficiency of the
HiddenMarkov Model andsequencematchingalgorithms,we musttestMPIguardusing
function call tracesthat representpossibleanomaliesof a parallelprogramwritten with
C/MPI on Linux.
5.3.1 Description
Torres[40] hasimplementeda setof C routinesthatsimulateanomaliesin MPI pro-
grams.Theseroutineswereadaptedto performexperimentswith MPIguardandthey can
bedividedinto two maingroups:
1. Anomaliesaregeneratedby modifiying thesourcecodeof anMPI program(ring).
In thefollowing chapterswewill refertheseanomaliesasdaemonattacks.
s RingMalloc: Beforethe parallelexecutionof theprogramfinalizes(but after
theMPI Finalizecall) a backgroundprocessis created(a daemon).This pro-
gramattemptsto allocatememoryN times. We have usedN=100 for all the
exampleattacks.
s RingFile: Beforetheparallelexecutionof theprogramfinalizes(but after the
MPI Finalizecall) a backgroundprocessis created(a daemon).This program
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attemptsto allocatememoryandreadafile N times.If thefile canberead,the
processappendsartificial datato it.
t RingFork: This programis similar to RingMalloc, but every time theprocess
attemptsto allocatememory, a new daemonis created.Sinceevery new dae-
monis anexactcopy of its parentthenumberof timesthisprocessis repeated,
M, hasto beverysmall.Otherwise,theattackwill completelyblockstheMPI




of thefunctioncall. Thedaemonattackscreatesanomaliesat thebeginningandat
theendof theexecutionof theMPI application.
Figure5.12Daemonattackfor ring
2. Anomaliesare generatedby including a new library betweenlibc/libmpi and the
stackof dynamiclibrariesof the run-timesystem(i.e. usingthe sameconceptof
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interpositionlibrary implementedin MPIguard). In the following chapterswe will
refertheseanomaliesasinterposerattacks.
u File attack: Every time theMPI programclosesa file F with the fclosecall, F
is copiedto a temporaryfile locatedin a directorywith readpermissionsfor
any user.
u MPI attack: Every time the programexecutesthe MPI calls MPI Initialize
or MPI Finalize a daemonprocessis createdwith the samefeaturesas the
RingMallocattack.
Sincetheoriginal versionof ring doesnot includefile management,wehaveadded
a small function to write datainto files (notethat this function doesnot affect the
overallbehavior of ring). Figure5.13shows this new function,
Figure5.13New functionincludedin ring to handlefiles
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Figure5.14shows thedistribution of anomaliesfor the interposerattackswith the
ring-modifiedprogram.
Figure5.14Interposerattacksfor ring -modifiedversion-
As explainedbefore,MPIguard’s Profiler canbeconfiguredto createa log of any libc
or libmpipro function. In orderto detectthe daemonandinterposerattacks,we needto
include standardC functionsfrom the malloc family (memoryallocation), fork family
(processbifurcation),andstring and file managementamongothers. It is important to
observethatMPIguard’sprofiler only generatestracesfrom thesamelevel of executionin
theprogram.As anexample,a malloccall doneby theMPI Sendfunctionis not profiled
sinceMPI Sendis beingprofiled. However, anexplicit malloc in thesourcecodewill be
profiled.
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With ring the daemonattacksgenerate14 different function calls andthe interposer
attacksgenerate17functioncalls.Table5.1showstheaverageof thenumberof anomalies











Figure5.15shows theaccuracy of anHMM trainedwith normalbehavior of ring on
process2 using8 stateswhen ring wasexecutedwith the daemonattacks. The HMM
is ableto distinguishbetweennormalandabnormalbehavior whenthe userthresholdis
small( vTwyxVz"xL{ ). As anexample,if v}|~xz thenumberof anomaliesdetectedfor normal
behavior with the 8-stateHMM is 111 (all are falsepositives),520 anomalieswith the




is detectingall theanomaliesproducedby thedaemonattackswith 0% falsenegativerate
but with 111falsepositives. It is importantto observe theimpactof theuserthresholdin
thedetection:With y almostall thefunctionsin thetracesareflaggedasanomalous
for theHMMs with 8,14,and20 states.
Figure5.15Detectingdaemonsattacksin ring with a8-stateHMM
Table5.2showsthebesttrainingtime foundusingasinput for theBaulm-Welchalgo-
rithm thenormalbehavior in process2.
Figure5.16shows the detectionof anomalieswith a 14-stateHMM andFigure5.17
showsthedetectionwith a20-stateHMM.
Figure5.18showstheaccuracy of a8-stateHMM for ring-modifiedwhentheprogram
is beingexecutedwith interposerattacks.The HMM distinguishesbetweennormaland
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Figure5.16Detectingdaemonsattacksin ring with a14-stateHMM
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Figure5.17Detectingdaemonsattacksin ring with a20-stateHMM
abnormalbehavior but the numberof falsepositivesis overwhelming. As an example,
usingasmallthresholdW , theIDS detects162anomalieswith normalbehavior (all
arefalsepositives),9201anomalieswith the File attack (3859falsepositives)and6550
anomalieswith theMPI attack (6342falsepositives).However, theHMMs canbeusedfor
detectionsincethedifferencebetweenthenumberof anomaliesof normalandabnormal
behavior is fairly high (in theaboveexamplethis differenceexceedsthe3500anomalies).
Table5.3showsthebesttrainingtime foundusingasinput for theBaulm-Welchalgo-
rithm thenormalbehavior in process2.
Theaccuracy of a17-stateHMM is shown in Figure5.19andtheaccuracy of a20-state
HMM is presentedin Figure5.20.
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Figure5.18Interposerattackin ring-modifiedwith a8-stateHMM









Finally, to test the generalizationcapability of the IDS, we computedthe accuracy
of the HMM on processor2 when the modelwascreatedwith the normalbehavior on
processor2 (exploiting theSPMDpropertyof ring). Figure5.21showsthedetectionwith
a 8-stateHMM, Figure5.22 presentsthe detectionof a 17-stateHMM andFigure5.23
shows theaccuracy of a 20-stateHMM. Theoverall detectionrateof theHMMs is fairly
similar to theHMMs trainedwith thenormalbehavior of process2.
Figure5.21Detectinginterposerattackson processor4 with a8-stateHMM
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Figure5.22Detectinginterposerattackson processor4 with a 17-stateHMM
Figure5.23Detectinginterposerattackson processor4 with a 20-stateHMM
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5.3.3 Sequencematching
Figure5.24shows the accuracy of the sequencematchingalgorithmusingfour dif-
ferentwindow sizes( *V** ) for ring with the daemonattacks. The tracefrom
process2 wasusedastheprofileof theapplication.Usingsequencesof length9, theIDS
detects109 anomaloussequencesfor the RingMallocattack (containing109 anomalous
functioncalls),409anomaloussequencesfor theRingFile attack (containing409anoma-
lous function calls) and30 anomaloussequencesfor theRingFork attack (containing30
anomalies).Thus, the IDS detects100%of the daemonattackswith 0 falsenegatives.





The detectionaccuracy of the sequencematchingalgorithmfor interposerattacksis
againfairly high. As an example,usingsequencesof length9 the IDS on processor2
found5466anomalous equencesfor theFile attack (containing5342anomalousfunction
calls 2 ), and230 anomaloussequencesfor the MPI attack (containing217 anomalous
function calls). Similar resultswereobtainedwith the othersprocessors.However, the
IDS detectsup to 6 falsepositivesin eachprocessorwhenring-modifiedis executedunder
normalconditions.




6.1 Simulating online detection
The resultsobtainedin Section5.3 leaduseto believe that both the HMM andthe
sequencematchingalgorithmcanbe usedto implementMPIguard’s Analyzer. We con-
ductednew experimentsto determinetheaccuracy of thedetectionalgorithmsin real-time
andthe resultswereplottedwherethex-axiscorrespondsto thepositionof the function
call in the trace(it canbe seenasa time dimension)and the y-axiscorrespondsto the
numberof anomaliesidentifiedby theIDS.
6.1.1 Sequencematching
Figure6.1 comparesthe normalbehavior of processor3 with the profile createdin
processor2 usingthesequencematchingalgorithmwith ~ . It showsthattheIDS only
detectsachunkof about10 anomaliesat theendof thetrace(falsepositives).
TheFile attack createsanomalieswhenafile F is closed.In ring-modifiedthis occurs
severaltimesduringtheexecutionof theprogramandapproximatelyat thesameinterval





Figure6.2DetectingFile attack in ring-modified-with SequenceMatching
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TheMPI attack createsanomalieswhenthefunctionsMPI Init andMPI Finalizeare
executedin theMPI program.In Figure6.3 we canseethatat thebeginningof thetrace
theIDS detectsup to 120anomalies.Afterwards,noanomaliesaredetecteduntil theMPI
programis finishing(attheendof thetrace),wheretheIDS detectsanother110anomalies.
Figure6.3DetectingMPI attack in ring-modified-SequenceMatching
We concludedthat the sequencematchingalgorithmis suitablefor online detection
resultingin few falsepositivesor negatives.
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6.1.2 HiddenMarkov Model
Figure6.4 comparesthe normalbehavior of processor3 with the profile createdin
processor2 usinganHMM with 17 statesand "L  . TheHMM detects2 anomalies
every 500 functioncallsapproximately, resultingin a classificationrateof 99.6%. How-
ever, thetotalnumberof falsepositiveswith thering trace(containing6500functioncalls)
is 162.
Figure6.4Monitoring ring-modified-on processor3 usinga17-stateHMM
Figure6.5showsthedetectionrateof theIDS with File attack andFigure6.6with the
MPI attack. Almost every functioncall is beingtaggedasanomalous,resultingin a very
high falsepositiverate.
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Figure6.5DetectingFile attack in ring-modified-usinga 17-stateHMM
Figure6.6DetectingMPI attack in ring-modified-usinga17-stateHMM
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Theseexperimentsdemonstratedthat in order to achieve online detectionwith low
falsepositive ratewe needto improveeithertheHMM modelor thedetectionalgorithm.
The original experimentsusedthe following stopconditionsfor the Baulm-Welch algo-
rithm:
¡ Whenthe log of theprobability of generatingthe sequenceO with the model ¢ is
lessthan0.001.
¡ Whenthenumberof iterationsreaches1000.
Attemptingto build moreaccuratemodels,we changedthosestopconditionsasfol-
lows:
¡ Whenthe log of theprobability of generatingthe sequenceO with the model ¢ is
lessthan0.0000001.
¡ Whenthenumberof iterationsreaches2000.
However, wewerenotableto find any ¢ with theBaum-Welchalgorithmthatsatisfies
thoseconditions.Sincewecouldnot improvethestochasticmodel,wetried to modify the
anomalydetectionalgorithmitself by usinga local framecount(LFC) [33]. TheLFC is
givenby theexpression£¥¤§¦©¨«ª­¬¯®±°~ª³² , where ª is the locality frame. Let ´oµ be the
currentfunctioncall and ¶ thesizeof the locality frame. ª is givenby ª·µ!¸º¹¼»¾½}®À¿ if ´oµ
is anomalous,and0 otherwise.In ourexperiments,thetotalnumberof anomaliesdetected
by theHMM is incrementedif andonly if £¥¤§¦©¨«ª­¬(®Á¶ , i.e. if the last ¶ functioncalls
wereflaggedasanomalous.
Sothenew detectionalgorithmcanbeexpressedasfollows: Givenanew observation




3. For eachoneof theobservationsÄoÅ .
Æ If Ç¥È§É©Ê«Ã­ËÍÌUÎ thenthecounterof anomaliesC is increased.
Æ For eachoneof thestatesÏÑÐ (if thestatecanbereachedfrom thepreviousone,
i.e. if theprobabilityof moving to thecurrentstateis greaterthansomeuser
thresholdÒ ) .
- If theprobabilityof producingthesymbol ÄoÅ in thecurrentstateÓÔÊÖÕØ× ÄoÅÖË
is lessthan Ò thenthefunctioncall in thetraceUT is labeledasanomalous
Æ If ÄoÅ couldnotbeproducedby any state(i.e. thefunctioncall in thetracewas
taggedasanomalousin eachstateÏÑÐ ) thencomputeÃ·Å\ÙºÚ¼ÛÝÜ}ÌßÞ elsecompute
Ã·Å!ÙºÚ¼Û¾Ü¯Ì~à
4. If C exceedssomeuserthresholdá thenthewholetraceUT is taggedasanomalous.
With a17-stateHMM usingLFC=9 weareableto reducethenumberof falsepositives
whencomparingnormalbehavior on processor3 with the profile. This canbe seenin
Figure6.7.TheHMM detects40anomaliesat theendof thetrace.
Figure6.8 shows the online detectionaccuracy of theHMM whenthe ring-modified
programis executedwith theFile attack. Finally, evenwith the improvementsdescribed
above thenumberof falsepositivesof theHMM for theMPI attack is overwhelming(see
Figure6.9).
Analyzingthedetectionalgorithmandthemodel Â weconcludedthatthelargeamount
of falsepositiveswith this attackis relatedwith thefirst setof functioncallsof thetrace:
TheMPI attack triesto allocatememory100timeswhenthefunctionMPI Init is called,
soat leastthefirst 100functioncallscanbecorrectlytaggedasanomalous.
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Figure6.7Monitoring ring-modified-onprocessor3 usinganHMM, LFC=9
Figure6.8DetectingFile attack in ring-modified-usinga17-stateHMM, LFC=9
79
Figure6.9DetectingMPI attack in ring-modified-usinga17-stateHMM, LFC=9
Since thereare very few distinct sequencesof length 9 producedby the attack to
MPI Init andthedetectionalgorithmkeepstrackof thepossiblestatesthatcanbereached
from thecurrentone,thesetof possiblenext statesis dramaticallyreducedanddoesnot
changeover time. Whenthe detectionalgorithmtries to classifynormalsequences(i.e.
after the initial attack)the small subsetof statesof â (the probabilitiesof transitionand
probabilitiesof producingoutputs)that thealgorithmis visiting doesnot containenough




WehavedemonstratedthattheHMM (with locality framecount) is ableto distinguish
betweennormalandabnormalbehavior, but it producestoomany falsepositiveswhenthe
program’s tracecontainsaquitelargesetof consecutiveanomalies.
6.2 The MPI/C program’s profile
By definitiontheprofile mustrepresentheoverall behavior of a programundernor-
mal conditionsanddoesnot changeover time. However, it is importantto observe that
whenanalyzingnormalbehavior of UNIX processes,researchersoftenfind theproblem
thatis very hardto definea uniqueflow of eventssinceevenwith non-complex programs
the interactionof oneprocesswith theoperatingsystem(file andnetwork systemfor ex-
ample)or with otheruserprocessescancauseawidevarietyof interruptions,systemcalls
and function calls. Henceit is possiblefor two identical programsto createdifferent
traces.SPMD applicationsintroducea new problem,becauseevenwith the samesetof
instructionsondifferentnodestheinput for thealgorithmscanbedifferent.
As an example,take ring with 4 processors.Using MPIguard’s profiler we obtained
four differenttraces,threeof themcanbeusedasaprofile (thefirst nodeactslikeamaster
node, soits behavior differsfrom theother3 slavenodes).
The following experimentsuseprofile p2, the programtraceof processor2 contain-
ing 6748callswith 10 differentfunctionsandprofile p3, theprogramtraceof processor
3 containing6745calls and10 different functions. Figure6.10 shows the detectionof
anomaliesof anew executionof Ringwith 4 processors.MPIguard’sAnalyzeris active in
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the four nodes.As we expected,theIDS detectsseveralanomalieswhentheAnalyzeris
executedin themasternodeanddetectsfew anomaliesfor theothersprocessors.
Figure6.10Comparingtheexecutionof ring with profile p2
Figure6.11repeatsthis experimentwithout usingtheAnalyzeron processor1, sowe
canseeclearly the detectioncapabilityof the IDS when ring is executedundernormal
conditionsin theslavenodes.Thesequencesof functioncalls that theIDS is labelingas
anomalouscorrespondto thestart-upandtheendof theMPI communication.
Figure6.12depictsthebehavior of theAnalyzerusingprofile p3andtheresultis very
similar to thedetectionaccuracy usingprofile p2.
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Figure6.11Comparingtheexecutionof slavesnodesof ring with profile p2
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Figure6.12Comparingtheexecutionof slavesnodesof ring with profile p3
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Weconcludethatthetraceof any slaveprocessorcanbeusedasaprofiler for theIDS:
The only anomaliesthat we might expectcorrespondto the beginning andfinish of the
MPI communicationtasksandspecificfunctionalityassociatedwith anodesasdefinedin
thesourcecodeof theMPI/C program.
6.3 MPIguard’ s Analyzer
Figure3.11depictsthearchitecturethatwe have proposedto analyzethebehavior of
the parallelapplicationsin eachoneof the nodesof the cluster: The Analyzerreceives
functioncallsvia sharedmemoryfrom theinterpositionlibrary andexecutesthedetection
algorithm. We choosethe sequencematchingalgorithmto instrumentthe Analyzerbe-
causewehavedemonstratedthatit canbeusedto detectanomaliesin real-timeof MPI/C
programswith low falseor negative rates.Thesetof parametersthat theAnalyzerneeds
are:





We have demonstratedthat MPIguard is able to detectanomaliesin real-timefor
MPI/C programsrunningin a Linux cluster. However, we collecteddatafrom smallpar-
allel applicationssuchasIS, ring andring-modified, andweproducedtraceswith nomore
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We wantedto build an MPI applicationcomplex enoughto demonstratethe useof
MPIguardfor largeparallelprograms.Wedecidedto modify thesourcecodeof LLCbench
[27], anapplicationthatincludesthreepoint-to-pointbenchmarkroutines,Latency, band-
widthandbidirectionalbandwidth, and5 broadcastbenchmarkroutines:roundtrip, broad-
cast, reduce, allreduce, andall-to-all. Thepoint-to-pointroutinesinvolvecommunication
from themasternodeto the lastnodein the rankof communication,whereasthebroad-
castroutinesinvolveall theprocessors.Thus,to monitorthebehavior of LLCbenchin the
clusterwhenit is executedwith 4 processorsweneed3 profiles: onefor themasternode,
onefor thelastnode(rank size-1) andonefor theothertwo processors.
This new applicationselectsoneMPI routinebasedon a normallydistributedrandom
numbergenerator, with themeanandthestandarddeviation computedexperimentallyto
executereducemoreoften thanthe othersbroadcastroutines,andto executethe point-
to-pointbenchmarkroutinesonly a few times. This processis repeated5000times. Fig-
ure6.13presentsthemain functionof LLCbench2.Themeanof thenormaldistribution







Table6.1shows thesizeof theprofile for everyprocessorwhereLLCbench2wasex-
ecuted.Weobtainedtraceswith morethanonemillion functioncalls,andasweexpected,
thetracesfrom processor2 andprocessor3 areidenticalandthey canbemonitoredusing
thesameprofile.
Deploying MPIGuard’s Analyzerin theclusterandexecutingLLCbench2with 4 pro-
cessorsproducedvery low falsepositivesratesasshown in Table6.2. It is very important
to observethatthetracesproducedby LLCbench2in eachnodechangeeverytimethepro-
gramis executed.However, theprofilecanbeusedbecausethecommunicationpatternsof















As anotherexampleof thecapabilitiesof MPIguard,weexecutedLLCbench2with the
MPI-attack definedin Section5.3. Figure6.15shows thenumberof anomaliesreported
by MPIguardin time spacefor the masternodeat the beginning of the executionand
Figure6.16 shows the detectionat the endof the execution. As expected,MPIguardis
ableto detecttheMPI-attack.
6.4.3 LU factorization
As a final example,we have chosenan applicationimplementedby Dandassto im-
prove the Gaussianeliminationmethodfor solving systemsof linear equationssuchas
ã³äåçæ
usingtheLU factorizationmethod[6]. The factorizationis distributedamonga
2 dimensionalgrid of processorsand“. . . in orderto improve efficiency, the distribution
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Figure6.15DetectionMPI-attack at thebeginningof LLCbench2
Figure6.16DetectionMPI-attack at theendingof LLCbench2
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schememustbedesignedto minimizeloadimbalanceby distributingthe“active” elements
asevenlyaspossibleacrossall processors.” [6, p.4]
Figure6.17shows thenumbersof anomaliesreportedby MPIguardwhentheLU fac-
torizationalgorithmfor a1000x1000matrixusingablocksizeof 10elementsis executed
undernormalconditionswith 4 processors.Onceagain,the anomaliesdetectedby the
Analyzercorrespondto start-upandendof theMPI communication.Themaximumnum-
berof falsepositivesproducedby MPIguardin a processorwas121. In orderto improve
the detectionrate,we usedMPIguard’s Profiler to generatethe tracesof 10 executions
of the LU factorization.By doing this, MPIguardis ableto learnmorefunction call se-
quencesthatrepresenthenormalbehavior of theMPI application.Theresultsareshown
in Figure6.18. The maximumnumberof anomaliesgeneratedby MPIguardis reduced
to 54. This experimentdemonstratesoneof themostpowerful featuresof MPIguard:the
ability to learnnormalbehavior from severalexecutionsof an MPI application.Finally,
Figure6.19shows thedetectionof theMPI-attack for theLU factorizationapplicationon
processor1.
The tracesproducedby this algorithm aresmallerthan the tracesproducedby LL-
Cbench2,but the communicationpatternsof LU-factorizationaremuchmorecomplex,
andit is a goodexampleof the typeof scientificprogramsthatareexecutedon a cluster
of workstations.It is importantto observe thatalthoughthisprogramwasimplementedin
C++,MPIguardis ableto collectandanalyzethefunctioncall tracesof libc andlibmpipro
withoutmodificationof its sourcecodeor configurationfiles.
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Figure6.20shows the latency of MPI SendusingLLCbench[27] with 4 processors
and20 iterationsandFigure6.21shows the averagebandwidthbetweenthe masterand
oneslavenodeusingunidirectionaltransmissions.
Measuringthe performanceof an applicationis a difficult task and it hasbeenan
interestingfield of research.We attemptedto measuredthe performanceof MPIguard
for two casescenarios:when the parallel applicationperformsextensive computations
with few messagesandwhenthe parallelapplicationgenerates everalmessagesamong
processorswith little localcomputation.Whentheapplicationexecuteslocalcomputation
without the useof a library, MPIguardis idle. The applicationselectedfor the first test
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Table 6.3 shows the averageoverheadin secondsproducedby MPIguard’s Profiler
andAnalyzerfor LU-factorization.An overheadof 2.48%is generatedwhentheProfiler
is activeandof 3.37%whentheAnalyzeris executed.
As we explainedbefore,LLCbench2is an extremeexampleof messagepassingbe-
causeit doesnot performlocal computationandexecutes5000point-to-pointandbroad-
castMPI functions.Also, it executesseveralmemoryandstringfunctionsfrom libc. Ta-
ble 6.4shows theaverageoverheadproducedby MPIguardfor LLCbench2.TheProfiler
producesanoverheadof 20.84%.This increaseon theexecutionof theparallelapplica-
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Table6.3Performanceof MPIguardfor LU-factorization
Task MeanDuration(seconds) Standard deviation
LU-factorization 104.27 1.11
Profiling LU-factorization 106.94 2.77
Monitoring LU-factorization 107.79 2.91
tion is dueto inefficientdiskaccess,becausein thecurrentimplementation,everyfunction
call that is interceptedby theProfiler is written on disk. Furthermore,thetraceproduced
by LLCbench2containsmorethan1.5million functioncalls. However, it is importantto
observe that for eachMPI applicationtheProfiler only needsto beexecuteda few times.
TheAnalyzer, applicationthatonly accessthedisk during its start-upto createthesorted
tree,producesanoverheadof 15.58%.
Table6.4Performanceof MPIguardfor LLCbench2
Task MeanDuration(seconds) Standard deviation
LLCbench2 1083.57 48.05
Profiling LLCbench2 1309.41 67.51
Monitoring LLCbench2 1252.44 71.53
In summary, theseresultsshow thatMPIguardproducesanacceptableoverheadof less
that 5% whenthe MPI applicationperformssomelocal computations(comparablewith
any othermonitoringsystem),but thereis a greatimpacton the performancewhenthe
numberof local computationsis low in eachnode.However, thereareseveralfactorsthat
we have to take into accountto measuretheperformanceof MPIguard,amongthemthe
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benchmarkalgorithmused,the numberand type of functionsbeingprofiled, the status
of the network in the cluster, andthe available resourcesin eachnode. An exampleof
the impactof thosefactorson the8-nodesclusterusedfor testingMPIguardcanbeseen




Wehavedemonstratedthatsequencesof functioncallscanbeusedto verify thecorrect
executionof anMPI parallelprogramin aclusterof Linux workstations.Whentheappli-
cationsareexecutedundernormalconditions,theonly setof anomaliesthatwe expectto
find correspondto functioncallsthatallow thestart-upandendof MPI communication.
We have implementedMPIguard,thefirst distributed-IDSapproachimplementedfor
ahigh-performancenvironment,thatis ableto collectandanalyzesequencesof function
callsof any C library for dynamiclinkedprograms.TheProfiler collectsfunctioncallsfor
eachnodeandcreatestheprofileof theMPI application.Thismodulecanbealsousedfor
debuggingor logging.TheAnalyzer, executedin eachnodeof thecluster, readstheprofile
of the currentMPI executableandexecutesthe detectionalgorithm. As a resultof our
experiments,we concludedthat the sequencematchingalgorithmhasa betterdetection
ratethantheHiddenMarkov Model . However, we believe that thedatamodelprovided
by theHMM is very powerful for largeparallelapplicationsandwe expectto presentan




We createdartificial datasetsto demonstratethe detectioncapabilitiesof the algo-
rithms,andwe implementednew attacksfor MPI programs.We conductedexperiments
with MPIguardin off-line andon-line modeandshowed that we canachieve low false
positiveandfalsenegativerate.
MPIguardcanbeusednot only to detectintrusions,but alsoit canbeusedasa fault
detectionmechanism.Even more,MPIguard’s architectureallows the incorporationof
additionalsensorsto monitorattributessuchasmemoryusageor idle time of a process.
With sucha configuration,a new tool canbe implementedon top of MPIguardto react
whena anomalyhasbeenfound. Also, MPIguard’s architectureprovidesde ability to
collectandmonitor functioncalls for morethanoneprogram,profiling a completework
sessionin thecluster. Experimentsneedto beconductedto demonstratethatMPIguardis
still accuratein suchascenario.
MPIguardis highly portableto othersUNIX-lik esystems,becausetheimplementation
of the interpositionlibrary and the sharedmemorycommunicationwas donewith the
standardC library. Furthermore,thereis notneedfor kernelmodificationor root access.
Finally, althoughMPIguard’scurrentimplementationachieveslow overheadwhenthe
MPI applicationperformslocalcomputationsandits performancecanbecompetitivewith
any otherIDS system,we still needto investigatetheperformanceof theProfiler andthe
Analyzerin a real-world cluster.
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